Paul Davies and Creation
By:  Doug McManaman

Davies, like Spinoza, rejects the notion that the universe as a whole must have been created by a superbeing who existed before the big bang. He says: "This line of reasoning is, of course, hopeless as it begs the question of who created the superbeing. More seriously, the concept of a causal chain stretching back to an uncaused cause, or prime mover, assumes that the act of creation occurs within time. Modern cosmology suggests that time itself came into existence with the big bang. There was simply no `before' for a god, or anything else, to form in. It was Einstein who demonstrated convincingly that time is an integral part of the physical world. Indeed, time can be manipulated in the laboratory, warped by both motion and gravitation. Clearly, a full explanation of the physical universe has to include an explanation of time itself....So if the universe does not require a creator in the causal, temporal sense, do we need any sort of God?"

Indeed, this line of reasoning is hopeless when taken outside its "existential" context, which is exactly what Davies and others have done with the argument. It is this "existential" level that Davies and his colleagues overlook as a result of their habitual empiriological frame of mind. Let me explain.

Time is relative to motion. It is the number or measure of movement according to a before and after. Time is not absolute, as Newton thought. As Aristotle clearly taught long ago - which Einstein resurrected - time follows upon motion or depends upon a moving thing. Because time follows upon motion, there is something prior to time, that is, prior not according to the order of time, but according to the order of perfection and completeness. Time depends upon motion, and motion depends upon a thing. For motion is the fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially. Time is not absolute; much less is motion "absolute" or independent. It is always a "thing" that moves, an entity, or a per se being or substance (not Spinozian substance). And since motion is the fulfillment of what exists potentially in so far as it exists potentially, the substance that moves exists in some way potentially. It does not have its being completely.

Let us move to the level of existence. The substance exists actually, but a being such as an atom of an element does not exist necessarily. An atom of gold has existence, just as a cat (even Schrondinger's cat), a plant, or a person has existence. But a gold atom does not have gold; rather the gold atom is gold. A thing is what it is (this is the principle of identity). This cat is a cat; it does not have cat. Conversely, a cat is not its existence; rather, it has existence. Recall that the "what" of a thing is its essence. A being, accordingly, is really a composite of essence and existence. If the cat is `what' it is and has existence, then existence is not part of the very essence of cat, nor is existence included in the essence of gold, iron, phosphorus, or a plant. These all have a received existence - they have being.

One cannot deny this without serious difficulties. For what belongs to the essence or nature of a thing does so necessarily. Right angles are part of the very essence of square. It is necessary that a square have right angles. Without them, it would not be a square, just as without circumference a circle would not be a circle. A square cannot not have right angles; a circle cannot not have a circumference.

But existence is not part of the essence of any contingent being. If existence were part of the essence of my cat, then my cat could not not be. My cat would necessarily exist. And if it could not not be, then it always was and ever will be. But this is not the case. My cat had a beginning and will have an end. Living, on the other hand, is part of my cat's very nature. Without life, it is not an animal; for an animal is a living sentient creature. But living and existing are not identical. Existence is not part of the very meaning of "living thing", otherwise all living things would necessarily be, and all beings would be living, which is clearly not the case. So, if my cat exists, it is necessarily living. It is also necessarily sentient. But it is not necessarily. It exists contingently. The essence of any contingent (non-necessary) being is in potentiality to existence.

It becomes an actual existent not by virtue of its nature or essence, but by virtue of an act that it receives. This act is the act of existing.

Now, nothing can bring itself into being; for then it would have to be prior to itself. It would have to exist in order to impart existence on itself - which is absurd. Nothing can reduce itself from potentiality to actuality. What is in potentiality to existence is reduced to actuality not by virtue of itself (prior to existence there is no "itself"), but rather by virtue of another already in act. Now, Davies writes: "...who created the superbeing....the concept of a causal chain stretching back to an uncaused cause, or prime mover, assumes that the act of creation occurs within time. Modern cosmology suggests that time itself came into existence with the big bang. There was simply no `before' for a god, or anything else, to form in."[1] But the causal chain in Thomas' argument does not stretch back at all; rather, it stretches upward (not in terms of space). It is not a question of stepping back into time. Right now Davies' existence (which he has as received) is not sufficiently accounted for by his nature (which is a human nature - and existence is not part of his essence). His nature accounts for his ability to communicate ideas in writing, his ability to see the ink on paper, but his nature does not account for his act of existing. As a human kind of being (nature) Davies is necessarily rational and sentient, but it is not necessary that he exist, otherwise he would have always existed. But at one time Davies was not, that is, he did not exist. He came into existence. He was a possibility that became an actuality.

Not only is it impossible that he bring himself into being, it is also just as impossible for him to sustain his existence. Whatever he does, he can only do on condition that he exist, i.e. feed himself. We keep ourselves alive, but we do not preserve our existence. We need to be before we can keep ourselves alive. We do not impart existence, that is, bring something into being from nothing; we can only act according to the powers of our nature, within the limits of that nature, and since existence is not part of my nature, we cannot act to impart being from nothing.

Now, there is no being in our experience whose essence includes existence. Nor is there anything within the physical universe whose essence is to exist. For if there is a being whose essence is to be, this being could not not exist. It would be a necessary being, and therefore it could not have come into being. It would have always existed, exist now, and will forever exist. And there could only be one being whose nature includes existence. For if there were two, what would distinguish the one from the other? This necessary being does not have being, but is its own being. This second necessary being would not have a received being; rather it too would be its own being. What would distinguish the one from the other would have to be something outside of what they are in common. Outside of being is non-being, or nothing, therefore nothing would distinguish them.

So this necessary being is one, eternal, and unchanging. Change or motion is the fulfillment of what exists potentially in so far as it exists potentially. But this necessary being is its own act of existing. If it is its own being, if its existence is necessary, then it does not exist potentially. And this necessary being cannot exist necessarily and yet at the same time have potentiality for any other mode of being (it cannot cease to be; it cannot change; it cannot be actualized by any accident, including time). For it is its own being completely and necessarily. For instance, Davies exists, he is a potential being realized or actualized, that is, made actually to be. But his existence is not possessed completely; for he, like the rest of us, lacks perfection. We continually become what we are. And so there is a great deal of potentiality within us (there is much that we don't know, for example). That potentiality is what we are (our nature). What he is is always potential, forever potential. It is this potentiality that his unique act of existing has made to be. It is a potentiality that is made to exist, that is, an essence (which has the potential to be). So, as long as we are, we are a composite of potency and act. We are radically potential. As a really existing being I am always in further potency to more being (not more act of existing, but a fuller realization of my nature).

But this being who exists necessarily, whose essence is not in potentiality to existence, but whose essence is to be, is not radically potential and consequently not open to further perfection. This being is its own act of being. This being is Act. This being Is most fully and perfectly. There is no potentiality in this being whatsoever. And if there is no potentiality in this necessary being, it is immaterial; for matter is potentiality towards act or form. Nor is this being extended (quantified), for what is quantified is potentially divisible, but a being whose essence is to be is not divisible into a multiplicity - for there can only be one of them. Moreover, it cannot have quantity; for only a substance that is potentially extended has quantity, but there is no potentiality in this being. Also, quantity gives us parts outside of parts. But a being whose essence is to be cannot have parts. Consider an entity that is extended, i.e., a block of iron. This part on the left is not found in this part on the right, rather it is found outside the other. But this necessary being whose essence is to be cannot have parts outside of parts; for if this part is being, there cannot be another part outside of this part; for what is outside of being is non-being or nothing. So there is nothing outside of being. Hence, this necessary being is immaterial and unextended, indivisible, unchanging and eternal. It cannot lack any perfection because it would then be in potentiality to being, i.e., more knowledge.[2]

This necessary being cannot be in the physical universe, for it cannot be contained. It has no extension, no limits (potentiality limits, but this being has no potency), and so it cannot be contained or circumscribed. It cannot have place, for then it would be subject to place - in potentiality to this place or that place. But we have shown that there is no potentiality in this necessary being. Neither is this being subject to time; for time is the number of movement according to a before and after. But this necessary being, this Ipsum Esse (Being Itself) does not move; for movement is the fulfillment of what exists potentially in so far as it exists potentially. And time is not absolute. Time is not prior to being. Being is prior to time. Only a material, extended, and moving thing is subject to time. But if this necessary being was subject to time, it would not have its being completely, but potentially. Hence, its essence would be distinct from its existence, that is, it would have existence. It would simply be another contingent being.

Now if all that exists now (at this indivisible instant) are contingent beings, then there is no sufficient reason for their existence. Since existence is outside of essence, not included in the essence (otherwise a necessary being would exist, which is what we are trying to prove), then not one of these beings accounts for its own existence or any other existent. If there is no cause of their existence, no sufficient reason for their existence, then they are not, which is absurd. For all of them are possibly not, for they possibly are. They are not reduced to actuality through themselves, as we have shown. They are reduced to actuality through another. This other is not a contingent being; for contingent beings can only act according to the powers of their nature, that is, according to the limits of their nature. If their nature is not their existence, then they cannot impart being, but can only make something out of something that already exists. A rock does not discuss concepts, nor does it reproduce. A plant reproduces, but it does not imagine and remember things. No contingent being imparts the act of existing on a non-existent (that exists potentially). A pine tree begets pine trees, rabbits beget rabbits, humans beget humans, but only a being whose nature is to be begets beings, that is, imparts the act of existing. And so rabbits can only beget their like (other rabbits of the same nature) if and only if this necessary being imparts existence on the rabbit and preserves the rabbit's act of existing throughout the rabbit's sexual and reproductive activity.

Even if we suppose matter (extended substance) to have always existed - the elements, for instance, it remains that extended substance always fails to provide a sufficient reason for its being or existence. The sufficient reason for its existence is outside of it. If there is no cause of the carbon atom's act of being, then it was never reduced from potency to actuality, and hence it does not exist.

So, creation in time is not a problem here. The reduction from non-being to being does not take place in time. For time follows upon an actually existing substance that is extended and actually moving. Creation does not take place in time, but always outside of time. And so there is creation even if we suppose the Universe to have always existed. Creation as such takes place outside of time, but the created material being came into existence in relation to its secondary cause (parent) who exists temporally. So there is a temporal relation, which is why there are birthdays.

So Davies is mistaken when he says that the concept of a causal chain stretching back to an uncaused cause assumes that the act of creation occurs within time. Moreover, there is no need to "stretch back" at all. Right now at this instant, there cannot be an infinite series of causes stretching upward. If there is no First uncaused cause of my existence (which I do not have necessarily), then there are no intermediate causes of my existence (for what is intermediate is so in relation to what is first and last). And since my own nature does not account for my existence, I do not exist, which is plainly false.

When Davies says: "there was simply no 'before' for a god to form in," he is treating time as an absolute despite the fact that he knows time to be relative. He is also imagining or trying to picture a god creating, which he can do only in time. And so he shows himself to be about as anthropomorphic as the naive populace he so arrogantly criticizes at the beginning of his article.

God's nature is to be, and so there is nothing that happens without His existential causality - for no contingent thing is the sufficient reason its own existence. No thing and no thing's activity has being without the primal causality of the First Being. He is involved in every existing process, and because He is the existential cause of all that is, nothing can happen by chance for Him. There is no chance with God. For anything outside His knowledge and will has no being.

¹Paul Davies, "Getting to Grips with God: science and the superbeing," <http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/itp/staff/pcwd/Guardian/1995/950504God.html>, May 04, 1995.

²See Thomas Aquinas. The Compendium of Theology (New Hampshire: Sophia Institute, 1993), I, sections 3-35.

³ Op.cit., "Getting to Grips with God: science and the superbeing."

Copyright © 1998 by Douglas P. McManaman
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